Regis Debray and Revolution by Ferrera, Salvatore J.
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations
1969
Regis Debray and Revolution
Salvatore J. Ferrera
Loyola University Chicago
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1969 Salvatore J. Ferrera
Recommended Citation
Ferrera, Salvatore J., "Regis Debray and Revolution" (1969). Master's Theses. Paper 2387.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2387
RFGIS DEBRAY AND REVOLUTION 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
by 
Salvatore J. Ferrera 
This thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
M~ster of Political Science 
1969 
Introduction 
Section I • 
Section II . 
Bibliography 
TABLE OF CONTEN'rS 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • e • • • • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 
7 
65 
91 
INTFODUCTION 
R gis DEbray, twenty-eight year old FTench Marxist 
philosopher, now sits imprisoned for allegedly giving assis-
tance to the late Che Guevara in his attempt at sparking rev-
olution in Bolivia. It is now of little significance whether 
or not the Bolivian government's claim is true that Debray pro-
vid2d active assistance to the rebels, or whether it is true, 
as Dt-bray contends, that he was simply an observer of Che's 
activities. These are political-legal points of interest which 
were for all practical purposes decidrd upon by the Bolivian 
government's sentEncing of Debray in October of 1967 to thirty 
years confinement. 
Of what interest then is RPgis Debray? The answer lies 
in the fact that Debray regard~d his revolutionary doctrine 
as a progression beyond prior Marxist rr>volutionology. The 
title of his row-famous book, Revolution in the Rf volution?, 
itself, makes obvious the fact that Debray believed he was 
saying something new. That his scheme seems to have failed in 
Bolivia is of slight consequence, at least in s~ction I of this 
study. My interest lies not in preparing an exegesis on how 
the doctrine failed to take into account Bolivia's airborne 
1 
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troops or the powerful tentacles of the CIA's Bolivian branch, 
for these are topics best reported by inquisitive and qualified 
journalists. Rath1'r, my aim is to view Regis D(' bray' s work 
in relation to the: philosophical base from which it claims to 
emerge, and upon which it claims to improve. This base is, of 
cours~, Marxism. Therefore, the central thrust of my examina-
tion will be to dFtermine the importance and3elevanci: of 
D bray's philosophy within revolutionary Marxist thought. 
In using the word "importance, 11 I mean Debray's signif-
icance as a philosophical product within a philosophy whose 
history has been dotted ~ith polemical confrontations, revision-· 
ist tend;· ncies, and charges of dogmatic stagnation. By claim-
ing his adherence to Marxism, he also claims to be a product 
of, for instance, the controversies surrounding the Third In-
ternational, or the historical ~xchanges between the Bolsheviks 
and the M:nsheviks. And it is because Marxist thought is so 
heavily interlaced with ideological differences that the label-
ing of Regis Debray a "Marxist" without further information 
is of little meaning tc the serious observer of this sort of 
affair. It is only after an academic dissection is performed 
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upon Debray's "revolution in the revolution, and it is viewed 
side· by side with the historical progression of Marxist theory 
and practice, that any and all importance can be given to 
D~bray as both an effect and a cause with revolutionary Marxism. 
It as as an effect that Debray has importance: and it is as a 
cause that he may have relevance. 
To speak of relevance, as I do in Section II, implies 
pertinence to some other thing. In tho case of Regis Debray, 
his relevance is to three entities: (1) Marxist theory: 
(2) contemporary Marxist-based govc,rnments and revolutionaries: 
and (3) contemporary non-Marxist (or in most cases, anti-com-· 
munist) governments. 1 In the case of category number one, 
De: bray' s effect is upon a tenet basic to orthodox Marxism. 
Despite polemics on various other issues, there exists little 
heresy in the unity of theory and practice, and it is with 
1Brcause reality is too spectrum - like to divide gov-
ernments in as arbitrary fasion as here, I ask that this pro-
cedur0 be accepted here on journalistic expediency. Not im-
portant are the specific countries to which these categories 
apply, but that there exists, within the complex arrangement of 
nation·-states, a political division of this sort. 
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this point of doctrine Debray is concerned. In fact, it is this 
principle through which D:cbray is operating and simultaneously 
commenting upon. Categories two and three are affected by 
Debray in a similar way. Marxist-base(! governments and n:"volu-
tionaries, und~rstandably, are highly interested in the move-
ment of Marxist revolutionary theory and practice. Although 
hamstrung by the passions, principles, and behavior made nee-
essary by their unavoidable participation with nation-state 
power politics, 2 ccntemporary Marxists still regard revolution, 
as ordered by dialectical materialism, the ultimate or decisive 
agency for change in those portions of the world not yet governed 
under a Marxist-communist arrangement. As for non or anti-
communist (Marxist) governments, oE:bray's influence is mainly 
in the area of increasing the instability of the status quo by 
innovation the existing threat, revolutionary Marxism. And in 
as much as his philosophy alters, improves, or simply sustains 
2For discussion of this point see John Plamanatz, Man 
ana Society, Vol. 2, (NPW York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 3~'7-402 
the existing threat 1 Debray is of interest to that which is 
threatened, the non-communist portions of the world. 
Hence, S:. ction I, in pursuing the importance of Regis 
.Debray, will involve itself with the concept of the unity of 
theory and practice, and his peculiar participation in the con-
cEpt. In its entirety, this section will consider Debray's 
works, Revolution in the Revolution? and two shorter ~ssays, 
as they have been published, and will at no time in this section 
make relevant the apparent failure of his theory in the Bolivian 
Guevara episode. However, this is not to deny the importance 
of Debray's theoretical "failure," for in terms of Marxian 
theory and practice, a lesson has been taught. 
This "lesson" will be the subject of Section II, where 
we shall examine Regis Debray's relevance and the failure of 
Debray' s theo,ry from a Marxian basis. That is to say, we shall 
" consider the impact in toto of his revolutionary scheme as 
observers in a revolutionary world. 
Preferring to keep speculation to a minimum, our approach 
will be generally directed toward bringing to the surf ace ques-
tions created by the efforts to Dibray to revolutionize the 
6 
revolution. Although it may prove anti-·climatic, answers to 
the questions raised will not be forthcoming in these pages. 
'I'o put forth "answers" would be QV<:rly presumptuous and com-
pletely out of context with the purpose of this study, which 
aims at capturing the Marxist-Debray message. The questions 
will appear, but the answers will come about only as time moves 
forward and while events take shape. One thing is certain, how-
ever, and it is that the questions will be answered. We must 
remember, as Debray put it, "For the revolutionary, failure is 
• ":! 
a springboard. 0 -
-:i 
-'Re::gis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?, (New York: 
Grove Press, 1967), p. 23. 
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As I have already hinted, the issue of R~gis Debray, 
from a philoseiphical standpoint, is intimately bound up with 
Marx's concept of knowledge through the unity of theory and 
practice. It would, however, be inappropriate ano a matter 
0£ mis-emphasis to now launch a comprehensive discourse en the 
many intricacies of this concept. 1 Nevertheless, because it 
is essential that this fundamental element be fully appreciated, 
I will preface the beginning of our DEbray examination with 
just enough words to sketch briefly the dimensions of this 
concept as I perceive them and wish to apply them. 
Because Marx was revolutionary in intent, he quite pre-
dictably opposed the materialism of the eighteenth century, 2 
which provided neither explanation nor agency for development 
and change. His theories clearly required a philosophy having 
1oiscussions of this concept may be found in the follow-
ing sources: 
R.M. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism, 
{Baltimore: Penquin Books, 1~63), pp. 57-60. 
Karl Marx, "Theses on Feurerbach" appears in Howard Selsam 
and Harry Martel (E'ds.) , ReadPr in Marxis'.t Philosophy (New York: 
Inte:·rnational Publishers, lS-63). 
2Represented by, for example, Holbach, La Mettrie, and 
Diderot. 
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the following attributed2 (1) materialistic, it has to bl: 
"scientific"; (2) determined, at least to the degree that the 
Revolution was inevitable; and (3) non-mechanistic, at least 
to the extent that it somehow resolved the tension between 
determinism and free will by making man more than simply a 
pa~sive element in the process of progress. It is to this 
final point that the Unity of 'l'hE-ory and Practice concept has 
relevance. 
We must bear in mind that to Marx the material world is 
reality. However, while the preceding materialists posited 
the notion that human knowledge of the external world, as well 
as all ideas about it, was produced by the impact of sensations 
upon our mind -- a passive procedure -- Marx. taught in his 
'I'heses on :t'euerbach that these sensations provided only stimuli 
to knowledge which completed itself in action. In short, Marx 
belit~ved that we perceive a thing as a part of the process of 
acting upon it. This is the unity 9f theory and practice, 
Marx's activist theory of knowledge which asserts that knowledge 
9 
iS firmly bound up with action (or praxi~. 3 Writing in 
Jhe Theory and Practice of Communism, R. N. Hunt elucidates 
on this matter: 
••• Marxists have always insisted that theory and 
action are one. A theory of which the truth is not 
confirmed by action is sterile, while action which is 
divorced from theory is purposeless, the two stand 
in much the same relation to one another as do faith 
and works in Christian the~loqy.4 
••• it is practice which alone dtermines the truth 
of theory •••• but on the other hand, theory equally 
determines practice. since, if the theory is wrong, 
its error will inevitably reveal itself in the sphere 
of action. 5 
The key to understanding lies in remembering the mater-
ialistic basis of Marxism. As has been pointed out already, 
the materialist approach regards matter as primary and the 
mind as secondary, as an entity formed on the basis of matter. 
Hence, as man engages in self-preservation, his ideas of his 
3This Marxian concept is one which has remained compar-
atively unchanged since its appearance. Mao. however, has 
claimed to "develop 11 the concept further in his essay of 1937, 
110n P:':'actice". But, the addition is not substantial, and an 
explanation unnecessary here. See Stuart Schram, The Political 
Thought of M!o-tse-tunq, (New Yorke Praeger, 1963), pp. 124-128. 
4Hunt, op. cit., p. 59. 
5tbid. 
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existence and his methods of living follow. Practice comes 
before theory. 
It was simply out of organizational preference that I 
reviewed Marx•s Theory and Practice concept. For with this 
For with this in mind, I believe we are now able to proceed 
on into the words of Debray with a foundation upon which to 
stand. And as time goes on, the relevance of what has just 
preceded will become fully apparent. 
At the very start of his book, Debray makes plain two 
points: One, that he disavows theory prior to the military 
actions of a guerrilla foco. 6 With no time wasted, Debray 
clearly alienates the intellectual, as well as the romantic, 
from a successful American revolution. Both being prone to 
reminisce and thaorize a sin of the gravest sort -- they 
are apt to fall victim to History's "advances in disguise". 
As Debray allegorizes, history, "appears on stage wearing the 
mask of the preceding scene," and it is the politicos, 
6Roughly translated from Spanish, it refers to a center 
of Guerrilla operations, as opposed to a military base. 
(French: Foyer) 
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intellectuals, and pure theorists who uselessly catalogue 
pieces of script, s~ to speak, which are inappropriate, and 
even deadly, t() the nee-as of contemporary revolution in Latin 
America. Henca, we are left understanding at the outset that 
r•:=volut ir'nary theory drawn fr.om experience foreign in time and 
geo9raphy to the~ strugqle at hand is DP bray' s foremost enemy. 
Th<? second point established early by Debray is that 
the armed guerrilla unit, the foco, is the military and polit-
ical a::nti::r of the revolutiona:i::-y mov~ment. Operating upon the 
premise that practice begets best theory, the only authentic 
agency for evolving theory, according to Debray, is that agency 
engaged in confronting the existing enemy, the guerrilla unit. 
By virtue of the fact that it is involved in deadly struggle 
with the army of the oppressor, the foco produces by necessity 
the rev8lutionary theory appropriate to the situation at hand. 
There are implications arising from this approach which 
appear at once. The role of the urban based "party" is reduced 
to being a distant secondary position. For as a body of per-
sons unable to ao meaningful battle with the bourgeoisie, they 
inherit the aura of "legal Marxists," a term used in 
12 
ideological confrontations to denote those who would rely upon 
an evolution of sorts to the ignorance of revolutionary tact. 
More specifically, an urban-based "party" -- very often the 
Communist Party -- at best, arrives at and transmits erroneous 
"theoretical 11 conclusions and programs based upon foreign ex-
periences. And at worst, the urban, non-revolutionary Party 
becomes the unknowing tcol of the oppressors. The· Part~~' s 
reluctance or inability to attaC'k the basis of its oppressor's 
state, i.e., the basic institutions, neuters its potential as 
an embryo for revolution and beyond. Debray plainly expresses 
the kern•:-1 arounc: wh:i.ch ht' has elaborated when he says that, 
"the union of thE"<n7 an,-=i practice is no~ an ;~nevi.tabillty but 
a battle, and no battle is won in advance. 117 
Debray ;;ic>ints out that the "sld guard" which he opposes, 
following :i. ts habit of insat:Lably theorizing, is responsible 
for the :wti0n of armed .S.~Je:.!1.:S_~. Briefly, this is a system 
which is looked upon by Debray as "suffering from a profusion 
------------··-- ---------·------··-----· 
13 
of admirable sacrifices," but inept as a revolutionary tact. 
It attempts to bring everyone within a rural area into the 
armed struggle, creating a mass guerrilla force of men, women, 
and children: it aims at establishing an initial zone in which 
the opporessor's army lacks control: and it appears to be 
chiefly a "holding action". Debray finds several shortcomings: 
(1) The scheme's success depends upon a tacit non-aggression 
pact between aggressor and rebel: (2) it threatens the lives 
of peasants within the zone by denying the organic separate-
ness of the armed unit to the civilian populationr (3) it 
is open to encirclement: and most importantly, (4) it has 
failed in, for example, southern Columbia (1964) and Bolivia 
(1965). As Debray remarks, 
A self-defense zone when it is neither the result 
of a total or partial military defeat of enemy forces, 
nor protected by a guerrilla front constantly on the 
offensive, is no more than a colossus with feat of clay. 8 
The brunt of Debray's attack on the system of armed 
self-defense is taken by the Trotskyites, who ai::E: apparently 
the vanguard of the "old guard." ·rhe common denominator shared 
by proponents oi armed self-defense and Trotskyites is a 
14 
reliance upon the trade union as the organizational base, motive 
force, and spearhead of the class struggle. To Debray this is 
heresy for two reasons. The first, of course, i3 that it em-
phasizes the urban units who have a history of being "corrupted" 
by urban politics: secondly, and most importantly, it is an 
approach born not of praxis, but of fond and hopeful recall 
of a currently non-existent situation. The harshness with 
which Debray denounces the Trotskyi.tes is understandable, 
being that the Trotskyites described by Debray clearly seem to 
be dogmatizing the events and arguments of the revolutionary 
ideas formulated at the turn of the century. 
Let us look more closely at the position Debray attributes 
to the Trotskyites. It begins by reducing the role of the 
guerrilla from primary to, at best, secondary. The task of 
forming factory and peasant committees, which will have as 
their purpose economic agitation, becomes the primary path 
of the revolution. As the class antagonisms increase in 
intensity, strikes and general uprisings in cities and moun-
tains gradually and ultimately serve to overthrow the bour-
geoisie. The revolutionary path, quite obviously, runs through 
15 
the doors of the union hall, so to speak. 
Hence. and for the reasons already 3tated, Regis DPbray's 
antagonism towards the Trotskyi tes is q1.:d te predictable. And 
to the degree that past attempts in Latin America at semi-legal 
approaches have resulted in corrupting the entire movement, 
Debray represents an expected doctrinal reaction. He firmly 
claims to adhere to the evolution of theory praxis, and there-
fore makes virtually sacred the form through which praxis shall 
be realized. 
In which way does Debray's program diff~r? Interestingly 
enough, it takes on a distinct Leninist hue in that it is clan-
destine, secretive, and select. The guerrilla unity functions 
independently of the civilian (peasant) population, thus re-
linquishing a need or obligation to defend it. The scle aim 
of the movement is the seizure of power, and its distinguishing 
feature is that the guerrilla foco, a single political-military 
group, serves as the embryo in which is contained the future 
revolutionary party and state. The military-guerrilla foco, 
as it experiences the struggle of seizing power from the exist-
ing state and of developing pertinent theory, forms a counter-
16 
state. It is precisely on this point, the counter-state, that 
Debray's importance within Marxist thougl"it comes directly to 
the fore. Far unlik~:- E;!ither "economic Marxists" whc stres~ed 
the eventual-·decay-of-capi talisrn approach or the "legal Marxists' 
who stressed the participation··Wi th-parliament approach, Debray' 
language aeems to be a Leninist-like adaptation to the revolu-
tionary struggle in Latin America. His emphasis on the aeizure 
of power might well mean that Debray represents revolutionary 
Leninism as revised and adapted for South America. His philos~ 
ophy places him squarely within the'hon-orthodox" wing of 
Marxism-Leninism, and his creation (dar€· I say addition?) of 
a revolutionaru cc.tmter-state places him squarE'lV in line for 
close examination. 
Why i9 the c~unter-~tate unique? Essentially, this 
aspect of aoctri.ne differs fy-om other social:tst concepts in 
that is -:Jlaces little hope in an evolution of society or in 
a revolution. led by a strata of the pooulation within the 
oppresseC! society. Rather than a counter-s9_q_iet_y, whi.ch many 
interpret entails the pure se:i.zure o'!:: exist;in_g_ state power. 
Unlike Lenin's cognizance in What Is To Be Done of a 
17 
"consciousness" (althouqh only of a trade-unionist sort) among 
the workers in the first few years of the 1900's, and uplike 
Mao Tse Tungs• observations that the pre-revolutionary Chineee 
proletariat was "the most politically conscious class in 
Chinese society." 9 Debray disregards the matter of conscious-
ness among the people, at least in the initial stage of the 
struggle. This is not to say, however, that Debray is without 
concern for mass consciousness. But as Debray views it, the 
armed unit will, by its military action, serve as a "small motor' 
and activate the latent consciousness a~ong the people. 
If Devray•s philosophy deserves to be regarded as a 
"revolution in the revolution," much of the credit for being 
so must be given to this aspect of "consciousness" in his 
program. For in a very distinct way, Debray's de-emphasis on 
mass awareness runs counter to Marx, Lenin, 10 Mao Tse Tung, and 
9ouote appears in an excerpt from Mao's "The Chinese 
Communist Party." See Schram, 9.2.• cit., p. 192. 
10Lenin's program, of course, was baaed on a small, secret 
party concept. But, Lenin also gave notice, if only as lip 
service, that his Bolsheviks needed mass consciousness. See 
Lenin Selected Works. Vol. 2 (New York: International Publishers 
1967), pp. 365 - 370. 
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Ho Chi Minh. The importance of this consciousness amon9 the 
masses lies in the f•et that it provided a legitimacy distinct 
from uputachiam" or "mass actionu movements which, paradoxically 
Debray denounces in his earlier piece, Latin J\p!erica! The Long 
Mtrch. I say uparadoxically 0 because Debray's formula exoner-
ates the disreqardinq of mass consciousness -- the foundation 
of Marxist revolutionary legitimacy -- in favor of military 
confrontation prior to mass awareness. The essence of this 
point is illustrated by Debray's use of Che Guevara's words, 
"It is not always necessary to wait for all the conditions of 
the revolution to be qivenr the insyrrest.ional foco can create 
tbem. 11 
This point is further exposed in his chapter titled 
"Armed Propaganda." It is here that Debray•s differences with 
preceding Marxist revolutionoloqy become apparent. Writes 
Debray: 
In other words, armed propaganda follows military 
action but does not precede it. Armed propa9anda baa 
more to do with the internal than with the external 
9uerrilla front. The main point is that under present 
conditions the most important form of propa9anda is 
1111frxist Strategy in Latin a.merica, p. 41. 
19 
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successful military action. 
Clearly, the above statement places Debray in theoretical 
opposition to so-called orthodoxy. We have only to remember 
that Marx, in Section IV of the Manifesto, spoke of the commun-
ists' role in promoting class consciousness as a prelude to 
overt revolutionary techniques. Or we can recall Lenin's 
What Is To Be Done, where he quite emphatically reveals the 
vanguard's duty to expose and a9itate the contradictions which 
lead to oppression between the bourgeoisie and the proleteriat. 
Indeed, the one constant we find in communist theory is the 
duty of communists, when objective conditions dictate, to 
a9itate and hasten the intensification of the subjective con-
ditions (inclinations) for revolution which the objective 
conditions have produced. This was constant at least until 
Regis Debray emerged. 
Reasserting his premise that conditions peculiar to 
Latin America and distinct from Asia and Africa must give 
12 Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?, op cit. p. 56. 
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rise to differing approaches to revolution, Debray goes on to 
herald the fact that, "Fidel did not hold a single political 
rally in his zone of operations. 1113 What are these Latin 
American peculiarities? The most striking peculiarity is that, 
unlike China and Viet Nam, Latin America is victim of an 
advanced type of imperialism. Where China and Viet Nam were 
involved in liberation struggles against foreign colonialists, 
the people of Latin America have no on-going military effort 
directed at a foreign occupational power. Instead, they are 
a highly dispersed and sparsely situated people who live under 
a virtually unassailable police-army force of oppression. An 
attempt to simply politically indoctrinate the population would 
greatly reduce the effectiveness of the already small and select 
guerrilla band. Also. it would expose the cadres engaged in 
indoctrination of the rural population to entrapment and. 
even more seriously, infiltration by informers. And in addition 
to the latent dangers to the foco, armed propaganda techniques 
in Latin America would invite serious reprisals upon the 
13 Ibid., p. 54. 
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"strategic" villages by the regime in power. The conclusion, 
according to Debray, is the need for a revolutionary force to 
"prove" the vulnerability C.)f the existing regime by direct 
military confrontation. Only after the guerrilla foco has 
weakened the oppressor's hold can it engage in overt propaganda 
methods and large-sqale enlistment programs. 
The Debray procedure of practically investing 1So0 
prior revolutionary concepts continues in his discussion of 
the guerrilla base. Here he shuns the idea of fixed bases of 
operation in favor of non-permanent poisitions. In Debray•s 
own wordsi 
_ •• for the guerrilla force to attempt to occupy 
a fixed base or to depend on a security zone, even one 
of several thousand square kilometers in area, is, to 
all appearances, to deprive itself of its best weapon, 
mobility, to permit itself to be contained within a 
zone of operations, and to allow the enemy to use its 
most effective weapons.14 
Debray is careful to cite definite reasons for disavow-
inq fixed bases, a successful concept Eor the revolutions 
in China and Viet Nam. As Debray views it, fixed-positions 
14 Ibid., pp. 62-63. 
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strategies require an extensive territory having poor communi-
cations to the backlands, high density of rural population, 
the existence of a common border with a sy1npathetic cou11try, 
and the absence of airborne enemy troops -- none of which, says 
Debray, can be found in Latin America. 
The alternative to a fixed guerrilla base is vividly 
portrayed Debray's remark., "In the initial stage the base of 
support is in the guerrilla fighter's knapsack."15 His te:ch-
nique of inversion regarding th~ guerrilla base is defended 
by his relating an experience of the Cuban revolution, Debray's 
exemplar supreme, in which Fidel Castro's preparing of a base 
camp prior to an extensive period of mobile encounters with 
Batista's troops proved erroneous and pr~mature. It was only 
after a year and a half that the guerrilla unit led by Castro 
had gained sufficient control over a zone of operations and 
were thus able to prepare a fixed base within the zone. 
The point wished to be made by Debray is, of course, 
that the theoretical necessity, based especially upon Mao 
Tae Tung•s experience in China, of preparing a base camp is 
15Ibid. I p. 65 
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dangerous and useless superimposition of strategy. Below is 
a lengthy quote of Debray made on the matter of base camps. 
The excerpt, however, is equally relevant to his entire phil-
osophieal posture. And for this reason, it has been included 
so as to allow a 9limpse of Debray speaking on his own philos-
ophy: 
That an intellectual, especially if he is bourgeois, 
should speak of strategy before all else, is normal. 
Unfortunately, however, the riqht road, the only feasible 
one, sets out from tactical data, rising gradually toward 
the definition of strategy. The abuse of strategy and the 
lack of tactics is a delightful vice, characteristic of 
the contemplative man -- a vie~ to which we, by writing 
these lines, must also plead guilt~. All the more ~eason 
to remain aware of the inversion Lauthor•s emphasi.!f of 
which we are victims when we read theoretical works. 
They present to us in the form of principles and a rigid 
framework certain so-called strategic concepts which in 
reality are the result of a series of experiment3 of 
a tactical nature. Thus it is that we take a result for 
a poif.!.:L_q_f departu;:!_. Lemphasis added/ For a revnlutionary 
group, military strategy springs first of all from a 
combination of political and social circumstances, from 
its own relationship with the population, from the limit-
ations of the terrain, from the opposing forces and their 
weaponry, etc. Only when these details have been mastered 
can seri011s plans be made. F:f.nally -- and this is even 
truer for guerrilla forces than for regular armies --
there are no details in the action or, of you prefer, 
everything is a matter of detai1. 16 
16Ibidl, p. 60. 
I 
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Debray's pattern is unchanged when he turns to a dis-
cuss ion of the gueri·illa focc 's relation to "the f'arty." The 
party, from sheer tradition, is the urban-based revolutionary 
organization which formulates policy based upon analysis and 
interpretation of the class struggle, participates in exist-· 
ing politics to varying degrees, and retains c~ntralcbmination 
over any guerrilla operation taking place in the hills. This 
is the "party" Mao Tse 'I'ung spoke of in his, The Struq9le in 
Chingkanq Mountains, 17 and it is the "party" of Ho Chi Minh 
today. Debray finds several errors in this tactical arrange-
1 P. 
ment. · -· It must be remembered, however, that Debr.ay is ope,ra-
ting upon the premise that only through praxis --- the acting 
out by revolutionaries -- can theory be formulated and/or 
tested. Hence, the inversion by D0bray cE the status given 
17 Cohen, Communism of Mao-Tse--Tung, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 53. 
18Problems perceived by Debray are: (1) descent to the 
city by foco leaders exposes them to ca_pturer (2) extraordinary 
dependence upon the city by the guerrillas, logistically and 
militarily1 and (3) lack of single command which, in turn, pro-
duces an uncoordinated urban-rural effort. 
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to the urban-centered party and that of the guerrilla foco is 
quite loqical and in keeping with demands of doctrinal consis-
tency. That the unit performing the military confrontation 
should be subjected to the superimposed theory (and domination) 
of the urban party, which has dared little or nothing in the 
way of meaninqful confrontation, contradicts the Debrayan 
perspective of Marx's theory of knowledge, i.e., the unity of 
theory and practice. 
Debray's list of reasons for opposing the party appear 
to be, on the surface, basically tactical in nature and thus 
need not be listed verbatum. What is of prime importance, 
though, is that his opposition is not tactical in fact, but 
firmly philosophical. Expectedly, while discussing the 
"artifical leadership of an improvised political front, 11 
Debray reveals an opinion of .. party" members: 
••• and such people are not yet liberated from the 
old obsession: they believe that revolutionary aware-
ness and organization must and can in every case pre-
cede revolutionary acticn.19 
19Debray, Revolution, op, cit., p. 83. 
rr-------------
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In diecuasin9 the nature of the Party, Debray makes 
two points which illuminate the practical considerations within 
x,atin America. These considerations serve to reinforce hia 
philosophical dedication to praxis. J'irst, Debray notes that 
•the initially 9reat disproportion between the strength of the 
revolutionary forces and t!dlt of the entire repreasion ~echan-
20 .• ism• makea revolution a concern, not of .aaas .combatants, but 
of experts grouped into ... 11 cadrea. Secondly, Debray reminds 
his readers that the young i-•voluti.onaries in Lat.in Aaet:ica 
lack the loft9 political experience of the sort he feels is 
required for the future in Latin America. He disavows t.he 
"pure" politician for hi• inability to lead an armed atruggle. 
Again, revealin9 the philosophical baeis of his p~ogram. as 
opposed to llei.ft9 eaaentially tactical, Debray asaerta, "By 
the experience •cquired in leading a guerrilla group, they 
L-;pure" mili~ry ra.eii become politicians as well. "21 !this 
20. ll2i4·, p. ae. 
21Ibid., P· a~ . .;· 
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statement, as do others scattered throughout his writings, 
emphasize the attainment of knowledqe (and theory) through 
action (praxis). This is clearly Debray's message when he 
denounces the Party, and it is so when he decries the continuing 
existence of alliances by the Party with other segments of the 
society. Labeling them "outworn, discredited Lan,g/ eroded 
by failure." Debray rejects the theory of the alliance of 
four classes: association with the national bourgeoisie: and 
the prevailing contempt in many quarters for the peasantry. 
There are three points of significance raised by Debray's 
attack on the prevailing theories and ideas just mentioned. 
In rejecting as not acceptable the "alliance" concept, Debray 
plainly follows throuqh, and is thus quite consistent, with 
his repudiation of theory drawn from foreign practice. More 
specifically, however, he is stationing himself out of doctrinal 
alignment with Lenin, Mao Tse Tung, and Ho Chi Minh the 
three foremost Marxist revolutionaries from whom "orthodoxy" 
can be determined. 
Beginnin9 with Lenin, we can see, for example, in 
his Preliminary Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question22 that 
22,.ppears in Lenin Seleted Works, Vol. 3, 22.• cit., 
428-438. 
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he was well aware of the peasantry. Lenin, reflecting his 
analysis of thj peasantry, was sure to cite differences bet-
ween mere toilers of the soil and those owning small plots, 
medium plots, and those known as GrossbauErn (big peasants). 
Only the latter two, the medium and big landowners, represent-
ed threats to the proletarian revolutioQ. The smaller land 
owners, as well as the simple toiler, were, according to 
Lenin's diagnosis, valuable allies to the struggle. 
Although it is little discussed, Lenin also looked to 
elements within the pourgeoisie for revolutionary comradeship, 
Below is an excerpt from his The Staqes. Trends. And Prosnects 
of The Revolution of 1906: 
The labor movement flares up into a direct revolution, 
while the liberal bourgeoisie has already united in a 
Constitutional-Democratic party and thinks of stopping 
the revolution by compromising with Tsarism. But the 
radical elements of the bourgeoi.sie and petty bour-
geoisie are inclined to enter into an alliance with the 
proletariat for the2!ontinuation of the revolution •••• (author's emphasis) 
Despite Lenin's allusion to such an alliance notion, 
it was with Mao Tse Tung that the concept truly surfaced. 
Although there is little question that Mao's formation of 
the alliance was based upon Lenin's earlier doctrinal 
23 
Fxcerpt appears in Cohen, .QE.· cit., p. 50. 
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suggestions regarding the peasantry and bourgeoisie, not to 
24 
ignore Stalin's pertinent remarks. Mao Tse Tung is given 
full credit for applying in practice a revolutionary movement 
made up of bouregois elements under the leadership of the van-
guard proletariat. One has only to read Mao's Analysis of All 
Classes in Chinese Society25 to perceive the extent to which 
Mao Tse Tung relied upon an alliance approach: 
The whole of the petty bourgeoisie, the· semi-
proletariat, and the proletariat are our friends, 
our true friends. As to the vacillating middle 26 bourgeoisie ••• its left wing may become our friend. 
The Vietnamese conflict provides an example of the 
alliance notion in total dominance, at least as an a?~nounced 
concept. Contained within an anonymously written pamphlet 
published by the National Liberation Front in 1967, we can 
detect frequent reference to the alliance idea. Ju~qing 
from the following paragraph, one could not help but conclude 
that the alliance principle appears to be the declared 
24stalin: "Hence, the Task of the Communist elements iri 
the colonial countries is to link up with the revolutionary 
elements of the bourgeoisie •••• " See, Cohen, Ibid., p. 51. 
25 Appears in Schram, .QJ2.. cit., pp. 143-147. 
26 
Ibid. I p. 146. 
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philosophical cornerstone to the National Liberation Front's 
movement in Viet Nam: 
The force that guarantees the fulfillment of the 
above task of fighting against U.S. aggression to 
save the country is our great national union. The 
South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation con-
stantly stands for uniting all social strata and 
classes, all nationalities, all political par~ies, 
all organizations, all religious communities, all 
patriotic personalities, all patriotic and pro-
gressive indi~iduals and forces irrespective of 
political tendency, in order to struggle together 
against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, 
wrest back 0~7 sacred national rights, and build up 
the country. 
The purpose of this philo-historical sketc~ is, 
as ! mentioned a short while back, to show the degree to 
which Regis Debray's repudiation of the alliance principle 
stands aside from the thrust of Marxist revolutionology. 
quite obviously, Debray believes the Latin American situa-
tion to be exceedingly distinct from prior events and 
experience. 
The second point of significance I wish to examine 
concerns Debray's disdain for the evolutionary elements 
within the Latin American socilaist movement. As a matter 
27Political Programme of the South Viet Nam National 
Front for Liberation (South Viet Nam: Giai Phong Publishing, 
1~67), p. 13. 
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of fact, this issue is closely coupled with the third point: 
past de-emphasis of the peasants' role. Therefore, both 
matters are best treated together. For when so taken, these 
twin issues provide substance for considerable analysis, which 
in turn fosters an understanding of Debray's importance as 
a Marxist philosopher. 
We may begin by focusing on the evolutionary trends 
within Latin America. It is unquestionable that leftists of 
the past, and even today, have engaged in activities somewhat 
less dramatic than guerrilla warfare and considerably closer 
to that of a trade unionist movement. E'ven today, we can rEad 
accounts of such activities. For example, a member of the 
Nicaraguan Socialist Central Committee urges as part of the 
Party's program, measures, 
To create and consolidate the different legal 
organizations waging a struggle in defense of the 28 
specific demands of the peasants •.•. (emphasis added) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
To make the most of existing P9§sibilities 
for legal work. (emphasis added)--
28 . Luis Sanchez, 
Liberation Movement." 
1~68, p. 37. 
29 . Ibid. 
"Nicaraguan Communists in Van of 
See World Marxist Review, February, 
1, 
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Another example can be found in the words of a 
prominent member of Haiti's People's Unity Party. Here 
we are able to discover, in addition to a decided reliance 
upon the Party, an obvious inclination towards Mao Tse 
Tung's alliance concept: 
Recognizing the need for armed struggle as the 
dFcisivefurm of revolutionary action in Haiti, our 
Party advanced the following guiding principle: 
'Greater Qolitical work among the masses must be the 
pivot of the preparations for the armed struggle.' 
We must make the most of the negligible opportunities 
for legal work, carry on underground activity as 
effective as possible, do everything to strengthen 
our Party and awaken thE political consciousness 
of as many people as possible.30 (emphasis added) 
'The armed frc,nt is therf'fore designed to become, 
in view of its organization and discipline, the 
broadest form of a people's union, including 
patriots of all trends .••• •31 (emphasis added) 
So, of what significance is it that Debray, unlike 
the indigenous Latin American Marxists just reviewed, shuns 
semi-legal participation and political works, and places 
instead, the entire spotlight on armed, clandestine 
guerrilla warfare to the extent of denying any initial 
value to the Party movement? The importance of Debray's 
30saintigene Guillaume, "Haiti and The Revolution." 
See, Weirld Marxist Rc:view, February, 1~68, p. 43. 
31 
Ibid • , p • 4 2 . 
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approach on the philosophical level flows not so much from 
what he says explicitly---much of which is on tactics and has, 
subsequently, been placed in serious question---but from what 
ramifications can be deduced from his having to say something 
in the first place. 
In this sense, Regis Debray is long expected doctrinal 
first-response to Marxism's encasement within the nation-·state 
arrangement. And as were Trotsky's permanent revolution and 
Lenin's law of unequal and uneven development early theoretical 
expression of apprehension regarding Russia's continuing 
existence in a "capitalist world"---overlooking the more 
generic demon presented by the nation-state arrangement---the 
Soviet Union has proceeded in practice to hedge somewhat on 
its intellectual honesty when overlooking the "imperialist 
potential" i.e., the need and desire of increaseJ national 
power they possess ipso facto as a nation-state, d~spite 
the absence of capitalist investments. The Soviet Union also 
has blinded itself to the pervasive effect State politics 
has had, and continues to have, upon the impulse of oppressed 
nations to disentangle themselves from that which oppresses the , 
in as much as the Soviet Union "politics" with virtually all 
the "capitalist" nation-states as do they with her. In brief, 
34 
the demands of State have had priority over the ideals of 
the socialist movement. With this in mind, one could say 
that Debray represents the Third World's implicit voicing of 
the belief that the nation-state arrangement---its necessary 
preoccupation with self-interest---has hindered, perhaps 
even inadvertently, the movement of independence and free-
dom. It is worth noting that within much of the "radical" 
student movements throughout Europe and the UniteC. States 
there exists an obvious renunciation of nationalistic per-
spective and an emphasis instead upon a horizontal, 
international perspective---a sort of man to man approach. 
It appears that the direction of the new politics, as 
embryonic as it seems, is away from obtaining images 
of the world and its problems from the mirrors of ones, own 
government, but rather from looking directly across at the 
world with un-nationalizaed eyes. More on this line of thougrt 
in Section II. 
This problem Debray is attacking, that of Marxist 
parties intertwining themselves into the national State 
fabric, can be '.:raced to discussions engaged in during the 
Second Comintern Congress (1920). It was during this period 
that Lenin issued his most concise statements regarding the 
r 35 
"backward" and colonial nations. And as it now seems, it 
was Lenin's insistence upon domination of the struggles by 
the urban and industrial proletariat pursuing the .formation 
of model Soviets which led to the "Marxist Establishment" in 
Latin America. In the Preliminary Draft Theses on the 
32 Agrarian Question, a major document of the Comintern 
(Third International) reflecting Lenin's view, we read the 
words: 
Only the urban and industrial proletariat, led by 
the Communist Party, can liberate the working masses 
of the countryside from the yoke of capital and 
landed proprietorship from ruin and the imperialist 
wars which will inevitably break out again and again 
if the capitalist system remains. There is no 
salvation for the working masses of the country!ide 
except in alliance with the communist proletariat, 
and unless they give the latter devoted support in 
its revolutionary struggle to throw off the yoke of 
the landowners (the big landed proprietors) and the 
bourqeoisie. 33 (emphasis added) 
This excerpt, howevel', does not re.veal the full 
story. Lenin was well aware of the peasants' potentialities. 
He was careful to include in the document a statement saying 
that the revolution • 
••• cannot be achieved unless the class struggle is 
carried into the countryside, unless the rural 
working masses are united about the Communist Party 
of the urban proleJ!riat, and unless they are trained 
by theproletariat. 
33 34 
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Several observations are in order. First, Lenin 
places responsibility for the revolutionary mission with 
the urban proletariat. S condly, Lenin regarded the Com-
munist Party--an organization he tied to the International--
as a representative of the revolution and, thirdly, Lenin 
strongly favored collaboration with bourgeoisie-nationalist 
elements within the backward nations. Says Lenin: 
The Communist International must enter into a 
temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in the 
colonial backward countries, but should not merge 
with it, and should under all circumstances uphold the 
independence of the proletajian movement even if it is 
in its most embryonic. form. 5 
Now Ught is being shed on the situation. Indeed, 
the course of the revoluticn, according to Lenin, was to be 
proletarian-nationalistic and was ta involve the peasants 
in so far as the proletariat was to "teach" them their missio 
Much like the parties and Trotskyites today in Latin 
America, Lenin never held for a peasant vanauard. In the 
Preliminary Draft Theses he reminds us of the Russian exper-
ience and lectures that the mass strike method is "al one 
capable of rousing the countryside from its lethargy ••. and 
revealing to them in a vivid and practical manner the 
35 
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36 importance of their alliance with the urban workers." 
However, the revolutionary proletariat, the vanbuard, 
was still to understand that "the deepest of petty-bourgeois 
prejudices" were inherent among the peasants, and that 
complete victory over capitalism would not be achieved 
unless both the proletariat and the working people in all 
37 
countries united. The meaning of all this is that Lenin's 
general doctrinal posture provided a basis from which revolu-
tionology evolved in China and Viet Nam. We can plainly see 
the culmination of a program based upon Party, Party control 
and bourgeois-nationalistic emotions in the socialist 
revolutions just mentioned. 
The essence of Debray's tact, with its guerrilla foco 
and rural emphasis, can be found in those same early 
discussions so dominated by Lenin. An Indian politician 
and Marxist revolutionary, Nath Manabendra Roy, forwarded a 
thesis at the Second Comintern Congress which differed 
with Lenin's thesis on one important matter; It emphasized 
371n his The Attitude of Social Democracy Toward the 
Peasant Movement, written in 1905, Lenin stateda Wi support 
the present movement in so far as it is revolutionary and 
democratic. We are making ready (making ready at once, 
immediately) to fight it in so far as it becomes reaction-
ary and anti-proletarian •••• " See Cohen, .2l2.· .£t!:_., p. 4. 
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agitation among the peasant masses, as coposed to Lenin's 
preoccupation with urban activities and nationalist leaders. 
Where Lenin stated, "The Communist International should support 
bourgeois-democratic national movements in colonial backward 
i "38 countr es ••• , Roy held that "the real strength, the 
foundation, of the liberation movement cannot in the colonies 
be forced within the narrow frame of bourgeois-democratic 
39 
nationalism." Roy posited the notion that communists must 
organize peasants and workers of backward countries into 
revolutionary organizations which, while preventing the 
domination of the mass struggle by nationalists, will assist 
a class conscious proletariat in its attempt to by-pass 
bourgeois nationalism and its accompanying factor, capitalism. 
As noted historian E. H. Carr relates to us, Roy's theses 
were not in contradiction to those of Lenin, but ·•they were 
markedly different in emphasis and, on the vital issue of 
tactics, seemed to point to a different conclusion." This 
conclusion, simply stated, was that supporting of bourgeois-
democratic revolutions, as proposed by Lenin, would merely 
38Lenin Selected Works, Vol. 3,_..Q2., .£.!S.., p. 426. 
39E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. 3, 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1953), p. 256. 
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serve to give strength to the capitalist order, and that the 
task of the communists would be better realized by opposing 
nationalistic trends. 
Roy's two premises were that the' workers and peasants 
of backward countries could be won for communism, "not through 
capitalist devdlopment, but through the development of class 
41 
consciousness," and that the bourgeoisie in capitalist 
countries prevented the proletarian revolution only by sub-
sidizing their workers out of the profits gained through 
colonial exploitation. Hence, the struggle must be directed 
against the bourgeois State power by means of an alliance 
of peasants and workers, directed by the latter, but 
conducted in the backlands. 
By turning to Debray's piece in the New Left Review, 
42 
"Latin America: The Long March," we see that the matter 
of the revolution in Latin America being either bourgeois-
democratic or socialist, a question which naturally arises 
from the preceding discussion, is given attention by Debray_ 
We quote his words: 
41 b'd L.!_., p. 256. 
42 September-October, 1965, Issue #33. 
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The nub of the problem lies not in the initial 
programme of the revolution but in its ability to 
resolve in practice theproblem of State power before 
bourqeois-democratic stage, and not after •••• In 
short, it seems evident that in South America the 
bourgeois-democratic stage presuppose! the destruc-
tion of 1he bourgeois State apparatus, 3 (emphasis added) 
What Debray is drivinq at is that the situation 
in Latin America, unlike conditions in Asia and Africa, 
presents a unique and original challenge to Marxists. Where 
in Asia and Africa the struggle against imperialsim takes 
the form of a front against foreign occupation, the liberation 
struggle in Latin America has been preceded by a period of 
"political independence." The struggles in Latin America 
proceed largely as civil wars and, as Debray points out, 
"the social base is therefore narrower, and the ideology 
consequently better defined and less mixed with bourgeois 
44 
influence •••• " However, as a result of the phenomenon, 
it has become necessary, according to Debray, to repudiate 
and replace existing institutions rather than participate 
in their function. It has been just this refusal to parti-
cipate in a protracted guerrilla stru9qle designed to awaken 
43Ibid., p. 51. 
44 
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mass consciousness of the need to replace atate institutions 
which has characterized the Latin American revolution as a 
coup d'etat, even when conducted in the name of the masses. 
Such "putsches",. observes Debray, are compelled to base 
themselves on existing institutions (established economic 
institutions, the army. etc.) in order to win th e quick support 
of the expectant people. Aaka Debray, 
Sinc.e the masses lack political consciousness 
or organization--things which can only be acquired in 
a long and difficult ~evolutionary experience--on whom 
can the government b&ae itself? Bow can it ask for 
the sacrifices which a real policy of national inde-
pendence would demand, if the peasantry and above all 
the working-class are not convinced of the need for 
them?4~ 
The answer, of course, is the revolutionary foco, 
which awakens the masses as it struggles to seize power from 
the existing State, contains the revolutionary State--a 
counter-State--in embryo, and engages in praxis upon which 
to develop for implementation a new program for society. The 
foco must disregard the national bourgeoisie, since this strata 
is now well aware of the process it would unleash by engaging 
in a genuine bourgeois-democratic revolution to free the 
peasantry. and proceed to do the revolution--an event .unavoidab~ 
45 
Ibid., p. 19. 
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socialist at its termination. As Debray makes explicit in his 
second New Left Review essay, "Marxist Strategy in Latin 
46 
America": 
To say that it has fallen to the proletariat 
and the peasants to accomplish the historic,tasks of 
the bourgeoisie is to say that the alternative today 
is not between (peaceful) bourgeois revolution and 
(violent) socialist revolution as tha promoters of the 
Alliance for Progress claimed, in agreement with the 
reformists, but between revolution tout court and-
counter-revolution •••• 47 (emphasis by author) 
Debray points out that to do otherwise, to "play" at 
revolution, is to fall victim of a dilemma which grants two 
' 
ways of losing to the unaware revolutionary1 he is eithera 
victim of a military coup during which he is jailed, exiled, 
or buried1 or he ascends to power, and by virtue of existing 
conditions and institutions, becomes an "armed demagogue, charg 
ed with sending revolutionaries to prison, exile,· or the grave 
48 (demo-bourgeois fascism)." 
Up to now, we have exami~ed Regis Debray•s importance. 
We have discovered, and to a degree discussed, his "nitch" 
within the Marxist construct. Discussion has purposely been 
devoid of value judgments, since such discernment is 
47Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
48 
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unnecessary for an exploratory examination. What we now 
have is background substantial enough to provide historical 
perspective and insight, and objective enough to prevent 
blurred vision. We know Debray is important to socialist 
circles, for his foundation is undeniably Marxist while his 
challenge is surely crucial to revolutionol09y in Latin 
America. What must follow at this juncture is a look into 
Debray's relevance to friend and for, philosophically speaking. 
To preface this next segment, I will briefly mention 
the points I consideras most urgent to Debray•s uniqueness 
as a revolutionary within the revolution. By no mere 
coincidence, ~t is these points which receive the brunt of 
his detractors' critiques. Fundamentally, I perceive two 
issues serving as the crux to the message of Regis Debray. 
One, Debray's emphasis upon praxis, and it as a source of 
theory in Latin America, within the unit of theory and practice 
conceptr and, two, his affirmation that therevolution in Latin 
America is to be socialist in nature rather .than bourgeois-
democratic or national-revolutionary, the latter being the 
name Lenin agreed to in dference to Roy during the Second 
' 49 
Comintern Congress. 
49Lenin Selected Works, Vol. 3, .22• .£!.!., p. 457. 
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The question of orthodoxy is, of course, begged through-
out an examination of this sort. After all is said and done, 
however, it is fruitless to proclaim a definitive value 
judgment regarding Debray•s loyalty to the conceptual entity 
named Marxism-Leninism, supposedly the contemporary measuring 
stick for determining orthodoxy. The reason is simple: there 
can be no clear and final answer. For example, where Debray 
and Lenin agree on the feasibility of "skipping" the capital-
ist stage of development by successful revolutionary countries, 
they disagree as to the role of the party. Does disagreement 
on the latter subject preclude agreement on the former? We 
know that Lenin, speaking of the revolution omitting the 
capitalist stage, admitted that "The necessary means for this 
cannot be indicated in advance, these will be prompted by 
50 
practical experience." But, wculd he have allowed 
"practical experience" to discredit the role of the Party? 
These are impossible questions. Being t.hat this inability 
to contrast and blend Marxism-Leninism with Debray has 
largely come about due to something unforseen by Lenin and 
uncontrolled by Debray, it becomes near-absurdity to try 
SOibid., p. 460. 
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dictum Romanus on the question of orthodoxy--yes or no--
concerning Regis Debray. 
What is of value is an examination of the "something" 
mentioned above, whichhappens to be capitalism and, especially, 
its influence and control over lesser developed and non-
industrialized countries. Hence, ·before striking out upon 
a discourse of the points already identified as crucial to 
Debray (praxis and the exciUsion of a bourgeois revolution), 
I will prepare the discussion with a glance at the unpredictablE 
actor of this political scenario, imperialism. 
It would be disastrous to view Marxism, especially from. 
the period of the Comintern•s theses on the colonial question 
on up to Debray•s Revolution in the Revolution?, as a revolu-
tionary doctrine developing in some sort of socio-political 
vacuum. Th! fact is, Marxist revolutionology has a history 
of "adjusting" to changes made by its antagonist, the 
capitalist order--even to th~ point of evoking questions 
by such men as c. Wright Mills as to whether or not there 
still exists a warm body qualified to be cal.led an authentic 
r 
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Marxist. Indeed, Lenin himself found it necessary to 
produce a "Marxist response" to capitalism's urmxpected 
"moribund" stage by writing his treatise, AmP.erialism, The 
Highest State of Capitalism. In fact, it was the insight of a 
52 
new era of capitalist expansion claimed by Lenin which 
provided the Comintern (Third International), and especially 
the §econd Congress, with its raison d'etre. Thus, it is not 
surprising that Debray, in both of his New Left Review essays 
speaks of another effect upon the struggle caused by the 
United States• change of tact, a change of tact brought on 
by the Cuban succeas. Although the "change" Debray comments 
on is somewhat less profound than that which Lenin observed, 
in that Debray's is more an increase in the weight of oppressio 
within the exploited region, whereas Lenin perct!ived a 
geographical move of the focus of capitalist exploitation from. 
51 
"L.ater .thinkers and actors have used, revised, elabor-
ated his ,LMarx',!/ ideas, and set forth quite new doctrines, 
theories, and strategies. In one way or another, these are 
indeed~sed Upon Marx,• although they can be identified 
with classical Marxism only by those who feel they must 
distort intellectual and political history for their un-
Marxist need for certainty through orthodoxy." See, c. 
Wright Mills, The Marxists (New Yorks Dell, 1962), p. 131. 
52 The concept had, in fact, been first pursued by a 
non-Marxist British Economist, J. A. Jobson, Some Fifteen 
Years Before Lenin, not to forget Rosa Luxemburg's discussion 
of it three years before Lenin. 
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the European cities to the "backward" countries. both men 
accept the axiom that revolutionary Marxism must adjust 
accordingly to changes in the capitalist system. 
Debray alludes to two facts: first, that Latin America 
has suffered less of a colonial oppression and more of a 
capitalist imperialism than other territories. As I pointed 
out earlier. Debray holds that this historical situation 
has served to narrow the revolutionary base and anti-
foreigner element of the revolution. Secondly, the effect 
of the Cuban success has been an increased awareness and 
determination on the past of the United States to suppress 
similar revolutions in the future. Stating the axiom, "A 
53 
socialist revolution also revolutionizes c:mnter-revolution," · 
Debray goes on to reveal that the Cuban success has "con-
demned to failure any mechanical attempt to repea~ the 
54 
experience of the Sierra Maestra." The pulse of 
Debray;s two facts is that Latin America has historically 
confronted an unusual imperialsim, is presently facing a 
revised challenqe and, in general, is the primary victim 
of a new imperialism. 
53wew Left Review, Issue #45, p. 21. 
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Despite Debray's apparent accuracy on this matter, 
he can not be credited with discussing this "new imperialsim" 
to any great depth. And being that the imperialist challenge 
seems to be the hiddal:prime mover, as it was likewise in 
Lenin's time, in determining the tactical manifestations of 
the revolutionology preached by Debray, a closer look at 
imperialism is certainly in order before taking up the 
observations and conclusions made by Debray. 
An essay in Monthly Review by economist Harry Magdoff 
51:\ 
entitled "The Aqe of Imperiali8tn" provides us with an 
incisive Marxist analysis of contemporary capitalist 
imperialism. Says Maqdoff: 
The imperialism of today has several distinctly 
new features. These are, in our opinion: (l) the 
shift of the main emphasis from rivalry in carving up 
the world to the struggle against contraction of the 
imperialist systemr (2) the new role of the United 
States as organizer and leader of the worle imperialist 
systemt and (3) the ri@g of technology which is inter-
national in character.v 
It is well worth my mentioning that in his essay 
Magdoff marks the Russian revolution in 1917 as the beginning 
of the newPl.ase of imperialism. The chief result of Russia's 
revolution was to introduce into the world capitalist system 
55 
·· J'une, 1968, pp. 11-54. 
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"the urge to reconquer that part of the world which had opted 
out of the imperialist network." As Magdoff puts it, the 
break up of colonial empires following World War II served 
to intensify the struggle, for although the a::>lonies were 
released, they had been interwoven into the prevailing 
capitalist arrangement. The task now of the United States, 
concludes Magdoff, is to prevent these former colonial 
possessions, e.g., Viet Nam, from leaving the established 
system. 
On the matter of the United States becoming the major 
organizer and leader of the imperialist network, we are able 
to see how the increasing technoloqical lead of the United 
States corresponded to its increasing responsibility for 
"enforcing" the arrangement. Mr. Magdoff, wishing to illus-
trate the extent of United States military commitment, 
reveals that the United States has its armed forces 
represented ("through distribution of military assistance 
and the direction of military training of foreign armies") in 
a total of sixty-four countries, as compared to three during 
57 
the 1920's and thirty-nine during World War II. Quite 
significantly, so Mr. Magdoff tells us, was the corresponding 
57 
Ibid., • 26. 
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increase in the quality and global nature of post-World War II 
technology. Increased research, atomic energy, space 
satellites, etc., all joinedto improve technology and, 
coincidentally, the manner of capitalist oppression. 
Without becoming excessively entangled at this time 
in Mr. Magdoff's fascinating analysis, I do wish to capture 
the essence of his message, which is that, 
The internationalization of capital among the 
great firms although there are more rival countries now, 
the power has shifted into the hands of a relative small 
number of integrated industrial and financial firms 
is of a much higher order today than was the case 
fifty years ago when Lenin wrote his work on imperial-
. 58 ism. · 
With Barry Magdoff's'analysis of "new imperialism" 
having been reviewed, even though in the most briefest 
fashion, we can better discern the whole of which Debray 
speaks only partially. The zeal with which ~~pitalism, i.e., 
the United States, baa fought to maintain the politico-
economic status quo in Latin America, and e~perially in 
light of Fidel Castro's success in Cuba, is actually' part 
of a changing imperialism. 
Schafik Handal, member of the Communist Party of 
Salvador, makes this pertinent and supplementary observations 
58Ibid. , p. 46 • 
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"A few years ago the continental tactics of U.S. imperialism 
vacillated between organizing armed coups and supporting 
military dictatorships ••• and encouraging reformism and 
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'representative democracy'." These opposing approaches would 
alternate in periods of ascendency, being given the name of the 
statesman in charge, e.g., Roosevelt, Dulles, Kennedy and Mann. 
But, this exchanging of opposing methods has ended and, as 
Handel continues to observe, "Today, the imp~rialists pursue 
a flexible policy in which both methods are employed either 
in turn or simultaneously, depending on the situation ... 60 
We are now prepared to return to the first of two 
significant points regarding Regis Debray, his emphasis 
upon praxis. And there is no better way to begin than to 
present Debr•y,•s own words on this important and controversial 
subjects 
Thus d?.:1& a divorce of several decades• duration 
between Marxist theory and revolutionary practice. As 
tentative and tenuous as the +econciliation may appear, 
it is the guerrilla movement--master of its own political 
leadership--that embodies it, this handful of men .. with 
no other alternative but death or victory, at moments. 
58 Ibid. I p. 46. 
59world Marxist Review, April, 1968, p. 54. 
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when death was a concept a thousand times more real, 
and victory a myth that only a revolutionary can dream 
of." (Che) r.rhese men may die, but others will replace 
them. Risks must be taken. The union of theory and 
practice is not an inevitability but a battle, an'i no 
battle is won in advance. If this is not achieved 
there, it will not be achieved anywhere.61 
There are two obvious statements contained in the above 
excerpt: (1) there has existed a "divorce" between Marxist 
theory and revolutionary practice in Latin America: and 
(2) such a "union" is possible, and the guerrilla unit 
embodies the union of theory and practice (for Latin America). 
As I have stated earlier, The Marxist theory-practice 
concept is at the core of the Debray philosophy. It is from 
this essential pivot that subsequent ideas about the foco 
make sense. However, it is on this aspect of his work that 
Debray receives considerable criticism. For example, we have 
Andre G. Frank and~. A. Shah, writing in Monthly Review, 62 
who statd unequivocally that "Debray divorces, or fails to 
marry, revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice." This 
is, of course, in sharp contrast to Debray's own words. 
Actually, the matter is quite uncomplicated. The 
controversy is rooted in differing interpretations of where 
Latin America is in the dialectical process. In fact, this 
61Debray, Revolution, o • cit.,p.107. 
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controversy is similar to what engaged in between the Bol-
sheviks and the Mensheviks during the pre-revolutionary years 
. . 63 in Russia. Where during the early years of the 1900's the 
Mensheviks believed Russia was following the dialectic by 
embarking upon a burgeois-democratic capitalism, which 
required their "legal" participation, Lenin held that it was 
the task of the revolutionary vanguard of the preletarian, 
i.e., Lenin's Bolshevik Party, to gain ascendency over the 
bourgeois-democratic revolution by activist means. Both camps 
sought, roughly speaking, the Marxist-socialist revolution, but 
Lenin "re-defined" the course of the dialectic had taken. 
Hc"nce, in a similar fashion do Debray and his critics compete. 
Believing as did Russia's "legalists" (later, Mensheviks) 
that armed confrontation would primarily be a result of (a) an 
an intensification of the objective conditions by the 
dialectical process within a developing Russian capitalism, 
and (b) an increased class consciousness (the subjective 
conditions) brought about by essentially non-armed tactics, 
631 purposely discount controversy with the Social 
Revolutionary Party (Founded in 1901, and considered the 
auccessor of the Narodnik left-wing) as being relevant because 
although the SRP urged peasant militancy, its a:>ncept of the 
Revolution was openly outside a Marxist context. 
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much of today's "left" strenuously opposes Debray's suggestion 
that the armed struggle by a foco becomes the means ~f prompt-
ing the subjective conditions in Latin America. As I have 
shown, Debray is accused of divorcing theory from practice 
and, secondarily, of not proving that the objective condi-
tions are matured in Latin America. Of the second accusation 
Debray is vulnerable. But then again, and assuming Debray's 
defense, how does one "prove" the status of the objective 
conditions? Even Lenin in The Development of Capitalism in 
Russia, his only work approximating an analytical commentary 
on the question of objective conditions, aimed not so much 
at "proving" the actual e:xistence of objective conditions, 
as much as he did aim at convincing the rural-oriented 
Narodniks that Marxism, with its vanguard of the urban 
proletariat, was applicable to Russia. ~or Lenin, the 
major clue that the objective conditions were in operation, 
aside from his own faith, was the occurrence of worker 
strikes during the 1890's which, subsequently, provided the 
basis for his early theoretical work on the Party, What Is 
To Be Done. We can also observe the impact on Lenin of the 
Russian insurrection of 1905 by reading the following 
~ 
paragraph taken from his "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution:" 
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The real education of the masses can never be 
separated from their independent political, and 
especially revolutionary, struggle. Only struggle 
educates the exploited class. Only struggle discloses 
to it the magnitude of its own power, widens its horizons, 
enhances its abilities, clarifies its mind, forges its 
will. That is why even reactionaries had to admit that 
the year 1905, the year of struggle, 'f7he "mad year," 
definitely buried patriarchal Russia.64 
Hence-, Lenin's way to theory, aside from the 11guiding 
light" provided by Karl Marx, was through praxis. And so it 
is with Regis Debray and his supposed "inversion 11 of theory 
and practice. 
Debray, particularly in his piece Marxist Strategy 
65 
in Latin America, has noticed that the failur~, of social 
and political revolutionary movemnets is due to (a) the 
I 
unusual political situation of Latin America, already 
discussed: and (b) the failure of Latin America's left to 
look to their own praxis for theoretical inspiration. So, 
as Debray has drawn the theory of the foco from the 
unique Latin American past and experience with the hope of 
attacking imperialism~ efforts (e.g., Peace Corps, Alliance 
for Progress) to squelch a rising social awareness of the 
objective conditions by attacking the State structures, which 
64Lenin Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 792. 
65 New Left Review, #45. 
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have made fascist-demo regimes and reformist tendencies un-
avoidable occurrences, his critics see him as ignoring theory. 
The reason is simple: the "theory" held by those critical of 
Debray is textbook or Menshevik-like Marxism, which may have 
some claim to orthodoxy in a scholarly-debative sense, but is 
looked upon by many contemporary revolutionaries as being 
morte. Hence, as L.:min broke with the Mensheviks and as 
Mao Tse Tung took to the countryside with a four-·class 
alliance philosophy,. i)cbray has, so to speak, taken to the 
mountains with a theory that has been drawn not from the 
Russian, Chinese, or Vi:tnamese experiences, but from that 
which has taken place in Cuba and seems true for the rest of 
Latin America. In essence, where Debray believes that Latin 
America has suffered under a bourgeoisie unable to complete 
the bourgeois-democratic revolution (precisely the argument 
forwarded by Lenin in defending the Bolshevik's need to seize 
power from the floundering bourgeoisie), his critics insist 
that he prove pbjectiveconditions will not bring on an era 
during which the existing Party approach will become rele-
vant and effective. Debray is stating: the link between 
imperialism and the Latin American State is such that an 
"abberrated" bourgeois situation exists requiring the seizure 
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of State power by the best means possible, which to Debray 
is a mass movement initiated and led by the uncorruptable 
guerrilla foco. To those critics who charge him with divorc-
ing theory from practice, e.g., Frank and Shah, SWeezy, Silva, 6 
Debray presumably would say that the current situation in 
Latin America is one in which the unity of theory and prac-
tice is actually inept theory wedded to foreign practice. 
That is, it is theory drawn from outside the unique Latin 
American situation, distilled into activities which, despite 
their bringing some class awareness (much like the trade union-
ist •truqgle Lenin praised, but regarded as insufficient, in 
What ls_~o Be Done), succeed chiefly in perpetuating the State 
which the movement ostensibly opposes. 
To Debray, the unity of theory and practice means 
an indigenous revolutionary theory (the foco) baaed on 
Marx's guide lines which, put into practice, is at once an 
improvement of earlier ideas and, by means of praxis, a creator 
of new and higher insight. The doctrinal aura, although 
differing in particularities, is Leninist by inclination. We 
might say that Debray•s claim as a Marxist is as real as is 
66 All appear in Monthly Review, July, 1968. 
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Lenin's Marx-ist authenticity--a point of continuing polemics. 
If the evidence presented thus far is insufficient to 
show Debray's Leninist roots on the matter of praxis, we have 
these revealing words by Regis: 
The theory of the i2..s.Q. Lauthor's emphasi.!/ can be 
best situated among the current political concepts, by 
relating it to the Leninist theory of the weakest link~ 
which it merely re-interprets in different conditions. 7 
(emphasis added) 
The second point of significance I listed earlier 
regarding the work of Debray is his handling of the tradi-
tional question within the "backward" countriesa Is the 
revolution to be socialist or national-democratic? By way 
of preface, I would like to add~that Robin Blackburn and 
Perry Anderson, editors of New Left Review, declare Debray's 
answer as an "enormous liberation" f:~an "the traditional and 
paralyzing debates on the continent over the 'stages' of the 
68 
revolution •••• " Debray's answer, that it must be socialist, 
and for the reasons discussed earlier, is an excellent example 
of his allegiance--for better or for worse--to an emphasis on 
praxis and, consequently, the Bolshevik-styled perception of 
67 New Left Review, #33, pp. 29, 30. 
68 
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the revolution. His answer on this ll'll tter is clearly a 
product of a particular predisposition regarding the unity 
of theory and practice. In content, his answer states: 0 It 
seems evident that in South America the bourqeois-democratic 
stage presupposes the destruction of the bourgeois State 
69 
apparatus." In actuality, the answer is mere a conclusion 
than a "formulation," the term given to it by supporters of 
Debray, Blackburn and Anderson. For, it com.es only_after 
Debrary tells us in Latin Americas The Long March how Latin 
American experience at, for example electoral participation 
(Chile), at urban guerrilla movements (Venezuela), and military 
putschism has been fouIXled on foreign Marxist theory or on 
no theory at all, and has achieved its success in making his 
philosophy a matter of utmost urgency, or so Debray implies. 
In order to fully understand the content of this 
conclusion we must progress to Debray•s thoughts on national-
ism. And here again, Debray stresses the extraordinary 
situation experienced by Latin America. Calling attention to 
the fact that Latin America's struggle is not one towards 
freedom from colonial oppression, but primarily one towards 
ending neo-colonialism, i.e., the internal influence and 
69New Left Review, #33, p. 51. 
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external grip of economically inspired and maintained imperial-
ism. This creates a certain path for the revolution. Writing 
in his earlier essay, Latin America: The Long March, and refer-
ring to his prime source of inspiration, Cuba, Debray explains 
this revolutionary coursea 
There is a i •• a reason why Fidelism lays a greater 
stress on revolutionary practice, when it is honest 
and sincere, than on ideological labels1 this is 
the belief that, in the special conditions of South 
America, the dvnamismof nationalist stru3gles brings 
them to a conscioqs adoption of Marxism. 7 (emphasis 
~de~ · 
We ·are prompted to ask what is the basis of Debray's 
belief that "a genuine nationalism in Latin America implies 
the final overthrow of the semi-colonial State, the destruc-
71 
tion of itz a.rmy, and the installation of Socialism." 
(emphasis added) The answer lies in. as expected, past exper-
ienee. Debray·points out that. traditionally, the I:atin 
American national State has received the bulk of national 
discontentment. owing to the unique .and overwhelming influence 
and staying power of imperialism, and the ancestoral possession 
of political power by indigenous groups, the primary 
political struggle has been between factions within the 
' dominant class (exporters and industrialists). The result. 
70Ibid. I p. 54. 
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as seen by Debray, has been a distortion of the real contradic-
tion between Nation and Imperialism. Thus, Debray's warning, 
"One must, therefore, always specify at what level opposition 
is situated: anti-governmental or anti-imperialist," 
reflects the essence of the problem: to awaken the un-
involved masses and destroy the State form which is 
irrevocably bound to dependence upon imperialism. 
In his review of Latin American nationalism, Regis 
Debray resorts to the same technique as used by him to survey 
past actions of the Left--recapitulation of errors--to 
present us with the background for his beliefs. Seeking to 
define his "model" Fidelism, also named revolutionary national-
ism, Debray tells us first what is is not: an ideological 
11
.tsrn 11 • It is distinct from bourgeois nationalism, which 
demands industrial and commercial protectionism in pursuance 
of a national State founded on industrial development (e.g., 
Frigerio in Argentina, Jaraguilia in Brazil); and is dis-
tinct from the nationalist and democratic government sought 
by most communist partie·s in Latin America because it, 
••• is organically linked to a socialist programme 
and it aims at the transformation of State power by 
means of its ccmquest and the destruction of the bourgeois 
form •••• It thus considers as illusory and ineffectual 
the partial demands, the transactions or the conciliations 
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of an eventual 'national government' which works for a 
revolution which woolcl advance in small steps.72 
Debray also takes up what he identifies as the two 
most historically important forms of nationalism in Latin 
America: Bonapartist nationalism and populism. Both of which 
sought to nni te the proletariat and the bourgeoisie under the · ,1 
leadership of the latter. 
In the case 8f populism as symbolized by Vargas of 
Brazil, an attempt at unity is made by utilizing anti-
Yankeeism. But, as Debray laments, such a tact eventually 
capitulates to United States influence because, not being 
led by a socialist proletariat, the dominant bourgeoisie is 
in a position "to come to an 'understanding' with U.S. i;I !I 
imperialism." 
With Bonapartist natim;.&lism, attempts are made at 
structural reforms from above. Lacking are changes in State 
power and a conscious movement of thP. masses. The result, 
reports Debray, is something considerably less than meaning-
ful change due to bourgeo-institutional resistance to sub-
stantial alterations. 
72 
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Again and again, we are compelled to confront the 
weight of De,bray • ~5 allegiance to praxis-inspired philosophy. 
In discussing these nationalisms we must meet face to face 
Debray' s contf.:-ntic11 that the existing State, an abberrated 
bourgeois power structure, does in fact rule and, in reality, 
pases as the major obstacle to a socialist movement. 
We also see that Debray's program ccintains a puzzling 
allusion to nationalism via socialism. Unfortunately for 
academic inquiry, he fails to spell out precisely the nature 
of "revolutionary nationalism." We have only indications, 
such as the following statement: 
Fidelism Lrevolutionary nationalism/ is not a 
special qualification, a constituted vanguard, a 
part of a band of conspirators linked to Cuba. Fidel-
ism is only the concrete process of the regeneration 
of Marxism and Leninism i~ Latin American conditions 
and according to the historical tradition of each 
country. It will never be the same from one country 
to the next; it can only conquer through originality. 
Let us hope that even the word disappears.73 
Hence, the revolutionary nationalism of which Regis 
Debray speaks, appears to allude to the mood and reason 
under which the people of Latin America are to move towards 
73 
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revolution. Rat.her than bc:ing both the motive and the goal 
of certain human-political activities, Debray allows it to be 
solely a motiv~. In this way, he is telling us that due to 
the presence of bourgeois-States, the oppression of imperialism 
is most directly perceived by the oppressed within a nation-
state context. The revolutionary surge is directed at ending 
the undesired effects already described and considered resi-
dual to the variations ov classical nationalism. Debray's 
nationalism is in effect, anti-nationalism1 or as he terms 
it, revolutionary nationalism. With this in mind we are 
better able to understand Debray's remark: 
_ A summary dialectic would thus make of Fidelism 
Lrevolutionary nationalis.m/ an a posteriori synthesis 
of two currents, national and international, national-
ist and communist. 74 (author's emphasis) 
74 . 7 Ibid., p. 5 . 
I 
I 
.I 
SECTION II 
W1=: know Rc~gis Debray was apprehended in a village 
of Bolivia late in 1967 while returning from some time spent 
with Che Gue\1ara. Alt.hough having engaged in one year of 
guerrilla activities, Guevara's lack of initial success was 
1 
a fact. Confirmed by his recnetly published diary, 
increasing army expertise and, most significantly, peasant 
apathy were the hurdles Guevara was unabli!? to leap. For 
instance, we see Guevara lamenting over worsening conditions 
in a monthly summary (September, 1967): " ••• now the anny is 
showing more effectiveness in action, and the mass of 
peasants does not help us at bl.ll and have become informers. 112 
The pertinence of this stems from the fact that Che Guevara, 
aside from having in large measure inspired the foco theory 
as a revolutionary in Cuba, was proceeding upon the foco 
technique in Bolivia. In a real sense, Regis Debray and 
1 See, Ramparts, July, 1 ~,68. 
2 . 6 Ibid., p. 8. 
65 
66 
Che Guevara were complementary: Debray, th$ revolutionary 
advocate: Guevara, the revolutionary practitioner. Therefore, 
Che Guevara's failure to spark the revolution in Bolivia must 
cast the shadow of failure upon Debray and his work. To para-
phrase Lenin, false theory will produce unsuccessful practice, 
and it certainly appears to have done so in the Bolivian 
episode. 
The first and most obviou~ question asks: Is the 
foco concept erroneous? Almost spontaneously, we are 
inclined to conclude "yes". For if Che Guevara's failure in 
Bolivia is not sufficient evidence, the apparent failures of 
3 
the focos in Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, and Colombia tend 
to provide overwhelming snpport for those who would disavow 
the foco theory. These numerous failures make us first 
recall Debray's remark about revolution revolutionizing the 
counter-rev~lution, and then wonder if perhaps Debray had 
unknowingly uttered in advance the reason for his doctrine's 
failure in Bolivia. Perhaps Guevara's notations about the 
increasingly effective Bolivian army were belated reminders 
.... ~"see, Dissent, May-June, 1968. "The Myth of The 
Guerrilla," Luis Mercier Vega,pp. 210-215. 
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of an underestimation of the degree to which the counter-
revolution has been revolutionized. 
There is still the problem of an apathetic and un-
trustworthy peasantry. Such a condition could be the result 
of more than one factor. Besides government attempts to 
improve their lot, there exists, for example, the peasants' 
dislike for 11 outsiders 11 1 their vulnerability to government 
propaganda or monetary inducements1 and, last, their actual 
contentment. But all these points, in the final analysis, 
becane quite secondary. Perhaps the peasantry should be 
approached in some fasion other than solely throuqh "example 
by military confrontation." That is, maybe there exists a 
tactical middle-qround between Debrar's organizational 
suggestion, and the concept of "armed propaganda," so hated 
by Debray. I repeat, these are secondary points \<fl ich bear 
chiefly on tactics. When all is said and done, no one can 
be certain if the foco technique, especially in Bolivia, has 
met with failure because it was acc6mpanied by improper 
tactics (e.g., severely limited contact with peasants, lack 
of substantial indtgenous rural representation in the 
68 
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foco, etc.), or if the Marxist prognosis, at least as it is 
defined by Debray, is fantasy from the start. Thus, to 
discourse on such details would be fruitless for the purposes 
of this study. And at this·ambiguous'juncture in Latin Arner-
ican revolutionology--represented by such men as Regis Debray o 
the left, Schafik Handal in the center, and Luis Sanchez on the 
right--it is impossible to be definitive in labeling a phil-
osophy's status. For the time being, I prefer to confine 
myself to interpreting the effects of the most immediate 
condition of Debr•J'·~s philosophy, especially as it is affec-
ted by Che Guevards failure, rather than being foolish enough 
to assume the future by pronouncing sentence. 
In place of evaluation, I choose to submit and pursue 
the issue of relevance. And actually, is this not the real-
istic thing to do? What historian, as he glances back 
through the years, concentrates on determining the rightness 
or wrongness of a philosopher? What is of interest, surely, 
is a man's relevance to his past, present, and future. The 
failure, even if momentary, of a man's ideas can be, and 
often are, the reason for his increased relevance at a later 
time. Let us recall such diverse men as Socrates, Jesus, 
4As Vega points out, most Latin American guer~illas are 
6~j 
Luther and Galileo. 
R1 turning to DE:·bray, we may begin an examination Df 
his relevance: by turning to his impact upon established Marxist 
governn1cnts. The first problem WE encounter is defining 
"established Marxist governments." This entire issue is one 
-Jf great proportions, but I shall become arbitrarily academic 
by limiting this 02scription to the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. Despite the so-called polycentrism of the communist 
movement within this area, the fact that these countries posses: 
a long national tradition as nations, are actively engaged 
in indigenously supported industrialism, and are relatively 
strong par~icipants in international political-econon~ic 
intercourse makes them peculiar to a common category~ 
The; characteristic most noteworthy within this category 
is a preponderance Df "nation-state-ism". I have purposely 
omitted the term "nationalism" simply because it fails to 
stress the effects of the State in the nationalism of nation-
states. ~- ~ wishing to go into great lengths, I do want to 
draw attention to the fact that the nation-state arrangement 
has produced little discomfort fc1r capitalist oriented 
States. More0ver. the arrangement is often beneficial in 
making profits, expansion, and order possible. Conversely, 
' 
r 
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the sovereign, nation-state organization of human societies 
has presented itself as an enigma to especially the soviet 
Union. Being the first to leave the capitalist cx:>mmunity of 
states, the Soviet Union had the job of coming to ideological 
grips with the fact that it would exist surrounded for some 
time by capitalist states. As I mentioned earlier, Lenin's 
law of unequal and uneven development and Trotsky's 
"permanent revolution" were both attempts to face this 
reality. It is not necessary to investigate these concepts 
or socialist expansion, for the point I wish to make concerns 
the degree to which the Soviet Union, despite its foundation 
of Marxist internationalism, was forced by the nation-state 
arrangement to behave as a State. This tendency of course, 
reached is highest expression in Stalin's "socialism in one 
country. " Itr is needless to go into depth on the matter in 
order to establish the point. The Soviet Union's participation 
in World War II, or its attempt to place offensive missiles in 
5 Cuba, are just two examples of the unavoidable effects of the 
5It matter not why one plays the game, but only that 
one plays. Bence, that the Soviet Union's actions may !are 
been "defensive" does not totally discharge the fact she is 
participating. 
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nation-state arrangement upon Marxism hopelessly encased within 
a nation-state. 
Having become obvious participants in nation-state 
a~~airs, the established Marxist governments must look at an 
ardent revolutionary such as Regis Debray with something more 
than purely fraternal eyes. Because they have witnessed 
first hand the inability of a shared belief in the Marxian 
. 
message to maintain solidarity, the Soviets and the nations 
\ 
of eastern Europe must regard Debray as a factor in the 
power struggle among States. The Soviets have only to 
remind themselves of maverick Cuba, not forgetting that it 
is Debray's source of inspiration, to realize the repelling 
qualities of nation-state·-ism, even within internationalist 
Marxism. 
That Regis Debray virtually raads the Corrununist 
Party out of Latin American revolutionary affairs serves only 
to intensify his relevance to the established Marxist 
governments. According to Lenin andthe Third International, 
the revolution in the backward regions can only occur when 
the class struggle is taken to the countryside and "the rural 
working masses are united about the Conununist Party of the 
6Lenin Selected Works, Vol. 3, 2.2.• cit., p. 42~'· 
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urban :;iroletariat. 116 To tee extent that Debray threatens the 
Soviet State, and its arm the Communist Party, byhis belief 
that "there is ••• no metaphysical equation in which 
7 
vanguard - Marxist-Leninist Party, 11 Debray is something less 
than a favorable element in ::he Soviet Union's already 
uncertain status regarding State influence in the developing 
countries. And as a natio!!·-otate intimately committed to, 
and dependent on, the "communist way," the polycentrism of 
the Party, coupled with tr;c Debray overture to revolutionaries 
outside the already questioning Party, makes for a precarious 
power-political situation as far as established Marxist govern-
ments are concerned. 
Regis Debray's relevance to contemporary Marxist 
revolutionaries has already been hinted at in this study. 
In essence, Debray, aside from the actual performance of his 
philosophy, has served as a provocateur of new thought. His 
influence continues today, for one can now detect a new sense 
of urgency in the Marxist mood within Latin America. Writing 
in support of theoretical works, Schafik Handal concedes that: 
OLenin Selected ·works, Vol. 3, OE,. cit., p. 429. 
7
oebray, Revolution, p. ~s. 
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The call for a new kind of discussion, for 
joint efforts in theory, should not be interpreted 
as a pDoposal to discontinue all action for the duration 
of the debate and the elaboration of theory. Quite 
the reverse. Revolutionary action must develop in 
scope and theory, because, among other things, it is 
action and practig4 that will resolve the controversial 
issues.8 (emphasis added) 
Clearly, the writings of Regis Debray have given 
impetus to a Marxist approach in Latin America best described 
as "impatient revolution." And depending upon one's political-
philosophical predisposition, Debray•s call to arms can be 
given one of the following perspectivesa 
(1) correct, because Debrazy·'s belief that 
objective cond1tions are ripe in Latin America, the 
foco technique will eventually prove to be best, and 
the revolution can be carried off without the Com-
munist Partyr 
(2) incorrect, because Debrar•s assumptions, 
as stated in #1, are not acceptabler or 
(3) incorrect, because the Marxist analysis 
is erroneous (dialectical materialism, the inevita-
bility of class struggle anc revolution, etc.). 
Regarding number one, very little can be added to what 
has already been presented. The revoltionology of Regis Debray 
is openly baaed on the idea that Latin America is ready for 
revolt, and that the main obstacle to revolution is the lack 
of consciousness. Viewed by Debray, the Latin American 
scene shows that it has been the army, serving as the 
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oppressive arm of the bourgeois regimes in power, and the 
impotent and reformist measures by existing Marxist-Leninist 
parties unable to progress because of unusual conditions in 
Latin America, which hav combined to prevent the classical 
revolutionary awareness and, consequently, an effective 
agency to make the revolution. 
Criticism of Debray by his Marxist peers, the objective 
of perspective number two, has covered every aspect of Debray's 
work. To be sure, they have disputed his interpretation of 
the objective conditions, his opinion of the Party, and his 
use of the foco. However, after close analysis, it appears 
that much of the criticism levelled at Debray arises from an 
"over-reading" of his thoughts or intentions. For example, 
when speaking of the position taken by Debray concerning the 
objective conditions in Latin America, his critics seem to 
miss the full meaning of Debbray's allusiton to the foco as 
the "small motoru. What Debray implies throughout his 
writings--perhaps his greatest fault (not having had the 
benefit of hindsight) is found in his failure to stress this 
aspect explicitly--is the notion that the readiness of the 
objective conditions cannot be contingent upon academic 
analysis or dissertation, but only upon action. And while 
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testing the objective conditions through activity, guerrilla 
action coincidentally serves to hasten along the development 
0f the subjective conditions, i.e., the social awareness of the 
masses. After the "take-off stage 11 has been achieved, and the 
foco is gaining participants and awakening the consciousness 
of the population, the struggle is to move forward with the 
foco being only one factor, albeit the central one, among 
many diverse elements, e.g., students, trade unions, peasant 
~' 
leagues, etc. Hence, Debray critic, Donald McKelvey, 
provides us with a worthwhile observation when he remarks: 
Revolution in the Revolution? Is in fact a 
very narrCM book, for it c:>ncentrates on a very limited 
period of time in the revolutionary process. This does 
not make it bad or worthless-quite the contrary. But 
it is a vast mistake, an historical abberration, to 
attempt to apply universally the truths and lessons 
of that limited period.lo (author's emphasis) 
It is with McKelvey's final point about the error of. 
unj. versally applying certain truths that Debray' s work is 
challenged. Perhaps only by default (in that Debray concen-· 
trated on merely th~ tc:Ke-off stage of the revolution, failed 
to stress the fact sufficiently, and was imprisoned before he 
C1 
··See, Monthly Revie!!,, July-August, 1968, p. 68. 
10 . Ilnd., pp. ~·2-~·3. 
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could issue sequels) does Debray become vulnerable to this 
attack. But the fact is, Debray does seem ambiguous as to 
boundaries to which he foresees revolutionaries .in Latin 
America being able to wander while they draw from the Cuban 
experience, Debrary's. "model." The weight of the implication 
one draws from reading Debray is that he sgggests a virtual 
one to cone situation. However, there appears from time to 
time on the pages of Debray•s work rather strong signals 
that a one to one lesson is not at all what he has 
in mind. Writing in "Marxist Strategy in Latin America," for 
example, Debrary encloses in his concluding paragraph the 
sentence, "It Fidelism is no way a closed model: assimilated 
and recreated by Latin American masses, it is the guide to the 
. 11 first step towards a continental revolution." 
Therefore, the only conclusion we can safely forward 
is that Debray's conclusion on this issue is based largely 
upon an individuals' interpretation of the Debrayan theme. 
Perhaps future writing on his part will serve to clarify 
this partially clouded question. While he will need to 
elaborate on the subject of "universality," Debray would 
11 
New Left Review, #45, p. 41. 
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be well advised to amplify on his judgments pertaining to 
the overall effects in Latin America of earlier struggles by 
the Communist Party. It is true, the thrust of his writings 
ostracize the Party and ignore any contributions it may have 
made. But, there appears in "Latin America: The Long March" 
the fellowing warning: "We should not overlook the debt of 
revolutionary nationalism to the actionand propaganda of 
Communist Parties, which were the pioneers of reasoned anti-
12 
imperialism •.•• " The implication of this statement is, 
of course, that Debray is cognizant of the effects produced by 
even the supposedly "ineffectual" Communist Parties of Latin 
America. And since a substantial portion of the criticism 
delivered at Debray, especially that of Cuban revolutionaries, 
Simon Torres and Julio ArondE', and Brazilian author Clea 
13 
Siva, challenges Debray's perception of the need for some 
degree of non-guerrilla preparation. Debray seems to have 
errored in not making his precise sentiments on this matter 
clear. 
12 . New Lift Review, #33, p. 57. 
13 
See, Monthly Review, July-August, 1968. 
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I believe there is considerable validity to a suggestion 
that Debray receives much of his criticism as a result of what 
he appears to imply, rather than strictly on the contents of 
his work. His ambiguity on the two issues presented above 
illustrate the source c>f confusion which Debray inadvertently 
embodied in his published material. Again I repeat, only the 
future can clear the air of these questions. 
While speaking of the future, I might add that although 
one may say in light of Che Guevara's failure that an examina-
tion of Deb ray's Castro-inspired foco theory has become 
irrelevant and purely academic, the fact is: revolution is 
far from being defunct in Latin America. And to the extent 
that the foco theory expoused byDebray, as put into practice 
by Guevara, has provided a lesson from which to learn, his 
ideae are relevant to affaira in Latin America. 
Ar1vancing to the third perspective from which Regis 
Debray may be viewed, which considers him just another victim 
of "Marx's fantasy", we can take note of a criticism of Debray 
voiced by "reformist" Marxists and non-Marxists alike. Luis 
Sanchez of Nicaragua's Socialist Party, who may be placed in 
the former category, states in obvious reference to the foco 
theory: "We were guided and continue to be guided by Leninist 
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thesis that Marxism recognizes all form of struggle, that it 
does not invent the forms and that it draws conclusion:; from 
experience gainea. 1114 Such a charge by Sanchez closely 
parallels a charge of "Blanguism" by non-Marxists. It is indeec 
paradoxical that both Lenin and Debray were moved to directly 
respond to identical charges of Blanquism. 
Lenin's response was contained in a letter to the Cen-
t.ral Committee during September of 1917, and it is characterizec 
by his own matchless polemical approach. For instance, at the 
outset of his letter Lenin notes that, "Bernstein LE'duard 
Bernstei_l.L, the leader cf opportunism, has already earned 
15 
himself unfortunate fame by accusing J\!arxism of Blanquism ••.. " 
Lenin's entire le'tter is aimed at explaining and justifying the 
seizure of po\,•cr by the Bolsheviks. Below is a key paragraph 
To be successful, insurrection must rely not upon 
conspiracy and not upon a party, but upon the advanced 
class. That is the first point, Insurrection must rely 
upon a revolutionary upsurge of the people. That is the 
second point. Insurrecticn must rely upon that turning-
point in the history of the growing revolution when the 
activity of the advanced ranks of the people is at its 
14
world Marxist Review, February, 1965, p. 35. 
15 
Lenin Selected Works, Vol. 2, .Q.P.· cit., p. 365. 
, 
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height, and when the vacillations in the ranks of the 
enemy and in the ranks of th(~ weak, half-hearted and 
irresolute friends of the revolution are strongest. 
What is the third point. And these three conditions 
for raising the question of insurrection distinguish-
ing Marxism from Blanquism.16 (author's emphasis) 
The point Lenin strives to make is that the insurrec-
tinn, although manifested by the Bolsheviks, must be a product 
of a "revolutionary upsurge of the people" prompted by events 
and conditions. Later in hi> letter Lenin states that 
insurrection during July 3-4 (1917), as opposed to "the 
September day:-;", would have been in error beca.i se: (1) the 
Bolsheviks lacked the support of the workers: (2) there was 
no countrywide revolt at the time; anc (3) there was n:) 
"'Jacillation" among th;: enemies and the petty·-bourgeoi.sie. 
Contained within bis essay, "Latin America: The Long 
Mar~h," Debray makea a reply to the issue of Blanquism in 
strikingly similar fashion. His discussion of the entire 
matter revolves around two points: (1) although the foco 
starts as a small group aspiring to the seizure of power, it 
is a minority whose plane, "unlike the Blanquist minority of 
activi*ts, aims to win ove1 the masses before and not after the 
16 
Ibid. 
r 
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seizure of power, and which makes this the ,essential condition 
17 
of the final conquest of power1" and (2) unlike Blanquism. 
which sought rapid success and functioned within the elite 
working-class of the craft industries, the foco seeks not to 
gain power by war or through military defeat of the oppressor, 
but thro1,J9li>the action of the masses, i .. e., the poor and medium 
peasants, as well as the>.;Work,ers. Quite obvio~uJly the emphasis 
by Debray, as it was with Lenin, is on the awakening of the 
masses by agitation de~.igned to evoke increased repression and 
intensification of the class contradictions, and their sub-
sequent participation in removing the existing government. 
What is of concern here to the non-Marxist is whether 
or not Marxism is proving itself viable. On the one hand, 
Debray charges the existing "Parties" in Latin Amed.ca with 
reformism. While on the ~ther hand, the so-called reformists 
suggest DE·bray is promoting a Blanquist-like movement, which ia 
an activity shunned even by the cCJmmunists~ This usually 
impli~it charge is shown in the words of Luis Mercier Vaga, 
cited earlier as a critic of the foco theory: 
17 
New Left Review, #33, p. 27. 
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- .... 
In this period of great transformations that 
confront almost all Latin-American countries, the cru~ity 
of gue:crilla methods, their remoanticism, their ao.olescent 
courage, but also their taste for total power and their 
oligarchic contempt for th~ masses whom they judge 
incapable of achieving their own emancipation will 
doubtless be replaced by a less exalted but no less 
difficult search for a revolution that would start 
from below1 a revolution made by nonprofessionals& o 18 
revolution that starts from--and returns to--the people. 
The interested observer is left puzzled, to say the least. 
To the non-Marxist, an impression is given that revolutionary 
Marxism is in the throes of its own evolutionary disintegra-
tion. If there are any valid grievances to be haard (poverty, 
economic domination, oppressive government, etc.), the non-
Marxist's perception of them is often and easily befuddled 
as his attention is drawn to what appears to be a band of 
guerrillas seeking to cause "unnecessary trouble" in the name 
of a deceased doctrine named Marxism. 
All that remains now is to examine Regis Debray's 
relevance to non-Marxist governments, and especially the 
United States. In the final analysis, however, for the United 
States to regarp Debray on simply the basis of what he says is 
robbing ourselves of his meaning. As far as we are concerned, 
Regis Debray is not to be ~onnd in a floundering set of 
tacaics~ in a comparative analysis of Bolivia and Russia's 
, 
B3 
insurrection in lSOS or Lenin's Bolsheviks of 1917, or in Mao 
Tse Tun97s Chinese experience. Rather, Debray has importance 
becaus~ he symbolizes a challenge, one which has the structure 
of a question. And to the degree that Debray is passionately 
seeking an answer to this question, which also confronts us, 
Debray is relevant. 
As we might expect, the question is not altogether 
simple, and an answer appears difficult. Nevertheless, the que -
tion must proceed. It is a question with three general facets: 
(1) It: asks about freedom and tyranny: 
(2) It asks about the immense economic abundance 
and influence in the hands of the advanced industrial 
States, and most especially the United States: and 
(3) It asks, although only implicitly, about 
nation-states. 
Regarding the first point, Debray, perhaps not so 
much in words as in general direction, expresses an 
impatient desire of m~ny in Latin America to flee the 
tyranny of injustice, especially the economic kind. In the 
words of James Reston, "The contrast between the rich and the 
. . 19 poor from Los Angeles to Biafra is hard to Justify." 
1 C; 
-Chicago's American, August 17, 1965. 
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But. this is not to say that Debray of others like him, 
in their zeal, are not capable of crC>ating "tyrannies of the 
left." Un~ueationably, this is a distinct possibility when 
political hopes meet harsh realities. And if we are to 
believe Crane Brinton's Anatomy of Revolution, this is a 
possibility not totally unexpected of revolutionaries. How-
ever, this speculative question is irrelevant to this study, 
for my aim at this point is merely to avoid the placing of 
the "Debrayan Quest" within an irrevocably tyrannical movement 
or sentiment. A passage from Hannah Arendt's On Revolution 
has pertinence here: 
His ,LMarx',!/most explosive and -indeed most 
original contribution to the cause of revolution was 
that he interpreted the compelling needs of mass 
poverty in political terms as an uprising, not for 
the sake of bread or wealth, but for the sake of 
freedom as well.20 
The point here is that the challenge of deprivation 
in the world is too awesome for even the sturdiest of national 
boundaries--the hindrances they can be--to •uppress the moral 
message which is seeking expression, even though sometimes 
imperfectly, in the call to revolution. And in as much as the 
20 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Hew York: Viking Press, 
1963). p. 56. 
, 
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status quo "belongs" to the advanced industrial nations in 
general, this era of revolution is of primary concern to the 
United States and its non-industrialized, non-Marxist allies, 
e.g., the countries of Latin America, in particular. 
All 11 acceptable '' explanatory reasons notwithstanding, 
the dominant industrial countries (the U.S., u.s.s.R., Japan, 
and Furope) present themselves in varying degrees as villages 
of prosperity surrounded by parched earth. Much of Asia, 
Africa, the Near Fast, and Latin America are, at best, second 
class participants in a foreign prosperity-producing arrange-
ment. And, at worst, they are spectators standing far 
afield while the game is being partially played in their 
own back yard. Assuming the worst, Regis Debray then becomes 
a person who has been impelled to voice concern for the alienat~d 
spectators along the sidelines. That his ideas are perhaps un-
favorable, even erroneous vis-a-vis acceptable thought within 
non-Marxist governmental circles, is decidedly unimportant. 
For at this moment, Debray's posisble error does not erase 
the chaD..enge or the question. And, that the United States fails 
to comprehend the positive effects of Regis Debray--his amplify 
ing the urgency with which a meaningful answer (meaning that it 
produces tangible results) to cyclical poverty and oppression 
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is being sought--is, however, highly important. As Arendt 
observes, our past record is not much better: 
Fear of revolution has been the hidden leitmotif 
of post war American foreign policy in its desperate 
attempts at stabilization of the status quo, with 
the result that American power and prestige were 
used and misused to support obsolete and corrupt 
political regimes that long since had become objects 
of hatred and contempt among their own citizens. 21 
Regis Debray is, of course, a revolutionary. For this 
reason he is inimical to the politics of those States seeking 
to preserve the status quo. But, the plain fact is: the 
impulse for freedom is very much alive in today's world, and 
the events surrounding the American blacks, the Czechs, and the 
Vietnamese proclaim that men now declare poverty and slavery 
intolerable, and domination invalid: As Reston adds, "The 
spirit of equality is challenging the old spirit of domination 
in every continent of the globe. Established institutions, 
creeds, and hierarchies are under attack in the communist 
and socialist and tribal as well as in the capitalist 
22 
worlds ••• " And that Debray has arrived at the conclusion 
that the oppression is due to capitalist, and especially 
United States' economic motives is certainly not discouraged 
-------·---------------------------
22 Chicago's American, loc • .£!!.. 
, 
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by actions on the part of the United States. Clearly, 
"We have acted as though we too believed that it was wealth 
and abundance which were at stake :in the postwar conflict 
23 
between the 'revolutionary' countries in the Fast and Wc:st." 
'I'he United States, however, is not alone. The Soviet 
Union is properly included in this discussion. Anyone who 
has observed the Soviet Union's difficulties in the Third 
World, especially in relation to China and Cuba, will realize 
that the tension between the advancing industrial States 
and the smaller or lesser developt~d countries is prompted, 
at least in part, by a factor otht?r than purely capitalist 
economic exploitation. This factor is the nation--state 
arrangement. 
If only indirectly, Regis Debray, as a representative 
voice of oppressed people within a section of the Third World, 
challenges the possibility that economic justice and freedom 
are able to emerge from the existing nation-state organization 
of the world. In a true sense, a universal morality based 
primarily on justice and freedom is coming into view, despite 
23 
Arendt, loc. cit. 
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Hans Morgenthau's conclusion that such an occurrence would 
require "almost super-human morale strength 1124 on the part 
of persons accustomed to national morality. "A vitality of a 
moral system is put to its crucial test when its control of 
the consciences and actions of men is challenged by another 
25 
system of morality." Stating this accurate prmmise, 
Morganthau, writing this soon after World War II, properly 
observed the stability of national morality. Today, however, 
this stability is threatened and the nation-states it 
justifies, by a tendency on the part of many persons to 
apply a universal code of evaluation-- a sort of man to 
man analysis-- to problems of War, Peace, Justice, Poverty, 
and Freedom. Almost as if to corroborate Hegel's thesis, a 
.l newer seiloe of Right is arriving and qaining in influence. 
The net effect of this change in moral perception is an 
increasing irrelevance for those nationalistic aspirati~n~ 
and fears which heretofore guided moral selectivity. Their 
irrelevance is to the same extent they interfere, so to speak, 
24 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd Edition 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1~65), p. 255. 
25 
_!bid. 
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with the Sermon on the Mount. 
It should n.ot be im'?lied from this study that I regard 
Regis Debray as the purveyor of the Answer. The fact is 
he is more a re-affirmation of the question. The answer, 
the complex and multi-facted thing it must be, lies in a 
profound readjustment of national and international institu-
tions in order to meet the dramatic changes in human moral 
perspectives. Barbara Ward•s suggestion26 that Western 
nations, and the United States in particular, must re-
examine the moral message'of the "revolution of liberty" 
in order to insure the·· safe transference of liberty is 
advice deserving immediate attention and requiring a 
courageous response. Will we do so? One thing certain is 
that the force generated by people in political motions is 
simply too great for institutions of the past to withstand. 
Change is inevitable. 
Regis Debray, then, becomes relevant to us an an 
expression of our task. Questions thisstudy provoked, 
26 • Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations, 
(New Yorks Norton, 1962), p. 159. 
even the unanswered or unan.Werable ones. are part of the 
relevance Debray has for us. Be is not so much a philo-
sophical and political adversary as he is a pang of con-
science and a reminder of responsibility. But. naturally, 
a pang of conscience requires cognizance of Right. and we 
shall express our moral position only as we seek to answer 
the challenges by the "spectators far afield." The answer, 
although not entirely defineable now. is definite only in 
its inevitableness. Our need to act wisely and justly is 
unavoidable, for the moment we fail to seek answers is the 
minute we surely fail. 
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